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Nicholas R. Rodriguez* 
Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp.: Risking Too Much 
on Ab Initio Conditions 
In Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp.,1 the Delaware Supreme Court considered 
whether the standard of review for a going-private merger by a controlling 
stockholder is the business judgment rule, rather than the entire fairness standard, 
when the merger is conditioned upfront on approval by both (i) an adequately 
empowered independent special committee that acted with due care to negotiate a 
fair price, and (ii) an informed, uncoerced majority-of-the-minority vote.2 
Reviewing this novel question of law, the court concluded that the business 
judgment rule was the appropriate standard when the controlling stockholder 
conditioned the merger on both of these procedural protections.3 While the court’s 
decision was properly motivated by the underlying justification in Kahn v. Lynch 
Communications Systems, Inc.,4 which was to protect the minority stockholder,5 the 
Delaware Supreme Court created potential ambiguity by adding a condition that 
the Court of Chancery did not—that the special committee exercise due care in 
negotiating a fair price.6 This simple phrase introduces an aspect of entire fairness 
into what the court fashioned as a business judgment analysis.7 Moreover, even if 
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 1. 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014). 
 2. Id. at 645. 
 3. Id. 
 4. 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994). 
 5. See infra Part IV.A. 
 6. M&F Worldwide, 88 A.3d at 645. 
 7. See infra Part IV.C. 
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the fair price condition is measured by a gross negligence standard, the 
transactional risks associated with upfront conditions will likely limit controlling 
stockholders’ use of the M&F framework.8 Finally, though the court had the 
opportunity to adopt a unified standard of review for going-private transactions, 
which would have reinforced its commitment to protecting the minority 
stockholder, the court failed to address this aspect of Chancellor Strine’s decision.9 
I. Statement of the Case 
In June 2011, MacAndrews & Forbes—a holding company—made a public offer to 
purchase the remaining shares of M&F Worldwide (“MFW”) in a one-step going-
private merger.10 At the time of the offer, MacAndrews & Forbes owned 43% of 
MFW, and offered to pay $24 per share for the remaining shares.11 However, 
MacAndrews & Forbes said it would not proceed with the transaction unless the 
merger was approved by both an independent special committee and a majority of 
the stockholders unaffiliated with the controlling stockholder (“controller”).12 
After the offer was received, the board of directors of MFW met to consider the 
proposal.13 Several directors recused themselves before the meeting,14 and 
eventually, the board formed an independent special committee comprised of its 
own legal and financial advisors.15 The special committee met eight times over three 
months and ultimately rejected MacAndrews & Forbes’ offer of $24 per share.16 
Once the committee increased the merger price to $25 per share, and after receiving 
a fairness opinion from its financial advisor, the committee unanimously 
recommended the merger to the MFW board of directors.17 Five members of the 
board recused themselves from the vote due to conflicting interests, and the 
 
 8. See infra Part IV.D. 
 9. See infra Part IV.B. 
 10. M&F Worldwide, 88 A.3d at 640. 
 11. Id. At the time of the offer, MFW shares were trading at $16.96. Id. 
 12. Id. at 640–41. 
 13. Id. The MFW board of directors consisted of thirteen members: Ron Perelman, Barry Schwartz, 
William Bevins, Bruce Slovin, Charles Dawson, Stephen Taub, John Keane, Theo Folz, Philip Beekman, Martha 
Byorum, Viet Dinh, Paul Meister, and Carl Webb.  Id. at 640.  
 14. Schwartz and Bevins recused themselves from the meeting because they had roles at both MacAndrews 
& Forbes and MFW, as did Dawson who had previously expressed support of the offer as CEO of Harland 
Clarke Holding Company, a company that owned three out of four business segments of MFW.  Kahn v. M&F 
Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 641 (Del. 2014).  Slovin recused himself at later point because he had a 
relationship with MacAndrews & Forbes that could raise questions about his independence for the purpose of 
serving on the special committee.  Id. at 641–42.  
 15. Id. at 641. The independent special committee consisted of four members: Byorum, Dinh, Meister, and 
Webb.  Id. 
 16. Id. at 652–53. 
 17. Id. 
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remaining eight directors voted unanimously to recommend the offer to the 
stockholders.18 Following the recommendation, 65.4% of the shares not owned by 
MacAndrews & Forbes voted in favor of the transaction.19 
Prior to the vote, a group of the unaffiliated stockholders sued MacAndrews & 
Forbes and the board of directors of MFW, alleging that the merger was unfair and 
requesting an injunction.20 These plaintiffs withdrew their motion for a preliminary 
injunction and instead sought damages for breach of fiduciary duty.21 The 
defendants then moved for summary judgment.22 
Examining this novel question of law, the Court of Chancery held that the 
deferential business judgment rule applies in a one-step going-private merger 
conditioned on the approval of an independent special committee and the non-
waivable approval of a fully informed majority of the minority.23 Specifically, the 
court held that the business judgment rule is invoked if: 
([1]) the controller conditions the procession of the transaction on the 
approval of both a special committee and a majority of the minority 
stockholders; ([2]) the special committee is independent; ([3]) the special 
committee is empowered to freely select its own advisors and to say no 
definitively; ([4]) the special committee meets its duty of care; ([5]) the vote 
of the minority is informed; and ([6]) there is no coercion of the minority.24 
The Court of Chancery admitted that Lynch could, and had been read to suggest 
that a controller who consented to both procedural protections would receive no 
additional legal credit and still be subject to entire fairness review.25 Because this was 
a novel legal question, however, the court stated that it was still subject to judicial 
interpretation.26 
Chancellor Strine (now Chief Justice Strine) examined the merger and found 
that all six conditions were met.27 Accordingly, the court reviewed the merger under 
the business judgment rule28 and granted the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment.29 Though the court was not squarely presented with the question of 
 
 18. Id. at  653 n.38. 
 19. Kahn v. M&F Worldwide, 88 A.3d 635, 638 (Del. 2014). 
 20. In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 499 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 502. 
 24. Id. at 535. 
 25. In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 500 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 517. 
 28. Id. at 524. 
 29. Id. at 536. 
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whether the business judgment rule would apply to a tender offer if the same 
conditions were met, the court hinted that if the equitable duties of a controller 
were consistent, an “across-the-board incentive system would be created to ensure 
fair treatment of minority stockholders” regardless of the transaction structure.30 
II. Legal Background 
In Delaware, going-private transactions by controlling stockholders (also known as 
a “freeze-out” transaction) are typically accomplished by one of four methods: (1) a 
reverse stock split; (2) an asset sale; (3) a negotiated merger; or (4) a tender offer.31 
The use of methods (1) and (2) are rare;32 reliance on the latter two methods, 
however, has provided for a vast amount of Delaware case law evaluating the 
validity of these types of transactions.33 
The third method, a negotiated one-step merger (also known as a “long-form 
merger,” “cash-out merger,” or “one-step freeze-out,” all of which are hereinafter 
“negotiated merger”), is a “bargaining transaction, the terms of which are 
negotiated by the management of the merging firms”—in the case of a freeze-out, 
between the controlling stockholder and the target corporation.34 To go private via a 
negotiated merger, the controlling stockholder will propose merging the target 
corporation into itself or one of its subsidiaries, and then the target board and the 
stockholders of the target company (both of which are dominated by the controller) 
will approve the merger.35 Once approved, the controlling stockholder will issue the 
unaffiliated stockholders cash or shares in the newly privatized company in 
exchange for their stock in the target.36 Following this process, the controller will 
execute the transaction as a statutory merger under Section 251 of the Delaware 
General Corporation Law (“DGCL”).37 
Unlike the negotiated merger, the fourth method, a two-step merger (also 
known as a “tender offer”), involves either a unilateral tender offer or a negotiated 
tender offer by a controlling stockholder at step one, followed by (in most cases) a 
 
 30. In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 503–04, 536 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 31. Marco Ventoruzzo, Freeze-Outs: Transcontinental Analysis and Reform Proposals, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 842, 
851 (2010).  
 32. There are many reasons why controlling stockholders avoid these two methods; mainly, because they 
have adverse tax consequences, they are expensive, time-consuming and cumbersome, and they may not always 
result in acquiring all of the equity. See Joshua M. Koenig, A Brief Road Map to Going Private, 2004 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 533, 537–39 (2004). 
 33. See infra Parts II.A–B. 
 34. David W. Leebron, Games Corporations Play: A Theory of Tender Offers, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV 153, 179 
(1986). 
 35. Priya Gupta, Freezeouts in Delaware: An Exploration of the Appropriate Standard of Review, 2012 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 707, 713–14 (2012). 
 36. Koenig, supra note 32, at 533. 
 37. Gupta, supra note 35, at 713; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 251 (2014). 
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“short-form” merger or a long-form merger at step two.38 The controller, making 
proper disclosures and adhering to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
(“SEC”) timeframes, sends a direct tender offer to the targeted stockholders to 
purchase their stocks.39 These timeframes are much faster than those of the one-step 
merger.40 If the controlling stockholder gains 90% of the shares, the controlling 
stockholder will be able to complete a “short-form” merger, which does not require 
approval from the minority stockholders and creates a private company.41 
If the controller does not gain the 90%, but the tender offer has been negotiated, 
the controller may be able to exercise a “top-up” option—meaning that the 
controller would be able to reach the 90% threshold by acquiring newly issued 
shares from the target company, and the controller would be able to complete the 
transaction as a short-form merger.42 If certain conditions are established, but the 
90% threshold is not met, Section 251(h) of the DGCL provides that the target 
company may eliminate the need for a stockholder vote at the second step.43 If the 
90% cannot be met by any method, the controlling stockholder will likely have to 
resort to using either a “long-form” merger, which will abide by the “long-form” 
process discussed supra,44 or they can use a “back-end” merger, which will “squeeze 
out” stockholders who have not tendered their shares by having the remaining 
stockholders give their written consent.45 
These transactions are reviewed under one of two standards of review: the 
business judgment rule or the entire fairness standard. The business judgment rule 
“is a presumption that in making a business decision[,] the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that 
the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”46 So long as there exists 
“a business decision, disinterestedness and independence, due care, good faith, and, 
according to some, the absence of abuse of discretion,” and the challenged decision 
does not constitute “fraud, illegality, ultra vires conduct or waste,” the business 
judgment rule shields directors from liability.47  
 
 38. Id. at 718. 
 39. Id. 
 40. David Offenberg & Christo Prinsky, How do Acquirers Choose between Mergers and Tender Offers 8 
(Sept. 28, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://mason.gmu.edu/~aphilipo/seminars/papers/Ten 
ders.pdf. 
 41. Gupta, supra note 35, at 718. 
 42. Symposium, Negotiating Acquisitions of Public Companies in Transactions Structured as Friendly Tender 
Offers, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 615, 666–67 (2012). 
 43. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 251(h) (2014). 
 44. See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text. 
 45. Symposium, supra note 42, at 621. 
 46. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
 47. STEPHEN A. RADIN ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES FOR CORPORATE 
DIRECTORS 25 (6th ed. 2008). 
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On the other hand, the more onerous entire fairness standard requires a court to 
evaluate the transaction for fair dealing and fair price.48 As the Delaware Supreme 
Court explained: 
[Fair dealing] embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how 
it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how 
the approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained. [Fair 
price] relates to the economic and financial considerations of the proposed 
merger, including all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future 
prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value 
of a company’s stock.49 
While both the negotiated merger and the tender offer ultimately create a private 
company, the standard of review used to evaluate these transactions varies; in 
certain circumstances, tender offers are reviewed under the business judgment rule, 
whereas negotiated mergers are subject to entire fairness review.50 Part II.A explains 
the development of going-private jurisprudence in Delaware as well as the Delaware 
Supreme Court’s adherence to making entire fairness the exclusive standard of 
review.51 Part II.B discusses the evolution of this jurisprudence after Lynch as the 
Court of Chancery developed seemingly divergent lines of case law that it later 
retreated from in favor of a more unified doctrine.52 
A. The Delaware Supreme Court has Consistently Held that the Standard of Review 
that Best Protects the Minority Stockholder in a Going-Private Transaction Involving a 
Controlling Stockholder is the Entire Fairness Standard 
In 1983, the Delaware Supreme Court first explored the use of entire fairness review 
to protect the minority stockholder.53 In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., the controlling 
stockholder, who owned 50.5% of UOP shares, froze-out UOP’s minority 
shareholders at $21 per share.54 Soon thereafter, the minority shareholders sued the 
controlling stockholder, alleging, among other things, that the price of the merger 
was unfair.55 Holding that entire fairness review applied to cash-out mergers by 
controlling stockholders, the Delaware Supreme Court found that the “business 
purpose requirement” (i.e., the business judgment rule) did not provide “any 
 
 48. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). 
 49. Id. at 711 (citations omitted).  
 50. See infra Parts II.A–B. 
 51. See infra Part II.A. 
 52. See infra Part II.B. 
 53. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710. 
 54. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 704, 708 (Del. 1983). 
 55. Id. at 703. 
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additional meaningful protection [to] minority shareholders.”56 The court noted: 
“the requirement of fairness is unflinching in its demand that where one stands on 
both sides of a transaction, he has the burden of establishing its entire fairness, 
sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.”57 Had UOP “appointed 
an independent negotiating committee of . . . outside directors” and had “each of 
the contending parties . . . in fact exerted its bargaining power against the other 
at  arm’s  length,” there would have been strong evidence that the transaction 
met  entire fairness.58 
Two years later, the Delaware Supreme Court in Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil59 
examined what impact, if any, a majority-of-the-minority vote would have on the 
standard of review in a going-private merger.60 Rosenblatt involved a one-step 
merger where 58% of minority shares voted in favor of the proposed transaction.61 
The Delaware Supreme Court found that the defendant, Getty Oil, who owned a 
majority of the target company’s stock, dealt fairly with the oil company’s minority 
shareholders.62 The court held that the approval of a merger by “an informed vote of 
a majority of the minority shareholders, while not a legal prerequisite, shifts the 
burden of proving the unfairness of the merger entirely to the plaintiffs[;]” it does 
not, however, change the standard of review to the business judgment rule.63 
While the Delaware Supreme Court would give no extra legal credit to the 
controlling stockholder if the transaction was approved by a majority of the 
minority shareholders, an open question still existed as to whether the use of a 
special committee would trigger the business judgment rule. This issue was 
addressed in Kahn v. Lynch Communications Systems, Inc.,64 where the Delaware 
Supreme Court held that a one-step going-private merger by a controlling 
stockholder is subject to entire fairness review, even when the merger is negotiated 
by an independent special committee.65 
In Lynch, the board of directors of the target company formed a special 
committee of independent directors to negotiate with the controlling stockholder.66 
During negotiations, the controller threatened to propose a tender offer directly to 
the minority shareholders if the special committee did not recommend the merger 
 
 56. Id. at 715. 
 57. Id. at 710 (citations omitted). 
 58. Id. at 709–10 n.7 (citations omitted). 
 59. 493 A.2d 929 (Del. 1985). 
 60. Id. at 937. 
 61. Id. at 936. 
 62. Id. at 937. 
 63. Id. 
 64. 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994). 
 65. Id. at 1117. 
 66. Id. at 1113. 
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at the price offered.67 The special committee subsequently recommended the 
transaction, and the minority stockholders filed suit.68 Applying the entire fairness 
standard, the court held that because the special committee did not have the ability 
to negotiate or “the power to say no,” the merger was unfair.69 The court explained 
that entire fairness review was “one way to provide [procedural] protections” to 
minority stockholders.70 Although the controlling stockholder was still subject to 
heightened judicial scrutiny, the court acknowledged that the initial burden of 
proof would shift to the plaintiffs if the merger was subject to either approval by a 
properly informed independent special committee or a majority of the stockholders 
who were unaffiliated with the controller.71 The court reiterated that in a merger 
between a controlling stockholder and a corporation, a court could not be certain 
that “the transaction terms fully approximate[d] what truly independent parties 
would have achieved in an arm’s length negotiation.”72 According to the court, 
protections “beyond those afforded by full disclosure of all material facts,” such as 
entire fairness review, should be provided to minority shareholders.73 
B. Following Lynch, the Standard of Review Evolved as the Court of Chancery 
Created a Divergent Strand of Case Law that It Later Retreated From in Favor of a 
More Unified Doctrine 
Two years after deciding Lynch, the Delaware Supreme Court provided 
ammunition to lower courts seeking to minimize Weinberger and its progeny. In 
Solomon v. Pathe Communications Corp.,74 the Delaware Supreme Court held that, 
absent coercion or disclosure violations, the maker of a tender offer had no duty to 
offer a fair price.75 Solomon was not binding on freeze-out case law because the 
tender offer was for less than all of the minority shares.76 Nevertheless, this decision 
began a movement by the Court of Chancery to treat tender offers and negotiated 
mergers differently.77 Lynch and the entire fairness standard would still govern 
negotiated mergers, whereas tender offers would be reviewed under the deferential 
business judgment rule absent coercion or disclosure violations.78 Beginning in 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1119–20 (Del. 1994). 
 70. Id. at 1117 (citations omitted). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 1116 (citing Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d  490, 502 (Del. Ch. 1990)). 
 73. Id. at 1117 (citations omitted). 
 74. 672 A.2d 35 (Del. 1996). 
 75. Id. at 40. 
 76. See id. at 37. 
 77. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 78. See infra Part II.B.1. 
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2005, however, the Court of Chancery retreated from this dichotomy and advocated 
for a unified standard of review.79 
1. Cutting Controller Freeze-Outs in Two: The Rise of the Business Judgment Rule 
in Tender Offers 
Following Solomon, the Court of Chancery began to narrowly apply Lynch.80 In In re 
Siliconix Inc. Shareholders Litigation,81 the Court of Chancery rejected entire fairness 
as the default standard of review for going-private transactions structured as tender 
offers.82 Here, the court held that the entire fairness standard would only be applied 
to the first step (the actual tendering of the shares) of a two-step freeze-out if the 
tender offer: (1) was coercive; or (2) contained disclosure violations.83 Thus, outside 
of coercion or disclosure violations, the default standard of review for the first step 
of a tender offer would be the business judgment rule.84 “[A]s long as the tender 
offer is pursued properly, the free choice of the minority shareholders to reject the 
tender offer provides sufficient protection.”85 The court offered three reasons why 
tender offers and negotiated mergers should be treated differently.86 First, the 
acceptance or rejection of a tender offer is the individual stockholder’s decision.87 
Second, in negotiated mergers, the target company enters into the merger 
agreement with the controlling stockholder; but in the tender offer context, the 
target company does not confront a comparable corporate decision because the 
target of the tender offer is the stockholder, not the corporation.88 Third, directors 
of corporations have a statutory duty of care when entering into 
merger  agreements, while controlling stockholders do not have such a duty when 
making  a  tender offer.89 
Only a month later, the Delaware Supreme Court in Glassman v. Unocal 
Exploration Corp.90 addressed the standard of review for the second step—the short-
form merger component—of a two-step freeze-out transaction.91 Unocal, the parent 
 
 79. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 80. See generally In re Siliconix Inc. S’holders Litig., No. CIV. A. 18700, 2001 WL 716787 (Del. Ch. June 21, 
2001); In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421 (Del Ch. 2002). 
 81. No. CIV. A. 18700, 2001 WL 716787 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2001). 
 82. Id. at *6. 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. 
 86. In re Siliconix Inc. S’holders Litig., No. CIV. A. 18700, 2001 WL 716787, at *7 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2001). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at *8. 
 90. 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001). 
 91. Id. at 243. 
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company, owned 96% of its subsidiary, Unocal Exploration Corp (“UXC”).92 Since 
Unocal owned greater than 90% of UXC, the transaction was being executed as a 
short-form merger.93 The court held that “absent fraud or illegality, appraisal is the 
exclusive remedy available to a minority shareholder who objects to a short-form 
merger.”94 The court reasoned that speed was the key motivation for creating 
Section 253 of the DGCL,95 and that the application of entire fairness review would 
be inappropriate given that it requires significant time.96 
Continuing down the path of treating negotiated mergers and tender offers 
differently, the Court of Chancery in In re Pure Resources Inc., Shareholders 
Litigation97 outlined the test to determine whether a tender offer was coercive.98 
While the court affirmed the Solomon line of reasoning,99 then-Vice Chancellor 
Strine acknowledged that this area of Delaware law was “fraught with doctrinal 
tension.”100 In attempt to alleviate this tension, the court held that a tender offer 
would only be considered non-coercive if: (1) the offer was subject to a non-
waivable majority-of-the-minority vote; (2) the controlling stockholder guaranteed 
the consummation of a prompt short-form merger at the same price as the tender 
offer if it obtained 90% or more of the shares; and (3) the controlling stockholder 
made no “retributive threats” in its negotiations with the special committee.101 
This  decision, although allowing for business judgment review of tender offers, 
revived  the underlying justification of Lynch and opened the door for a unified 
standard  of  review. 
2. The Retreat: A Recent Movement Towards a Unified Standard of Review 
In In re Cox Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation,102 the Court of Chancery 
saw the opportunity to reconcile seemingly divergent strands of case law in favor of 
a unified standard of review post-Pure Resources.103 In dicta, Cox suggested that the 
standard governing going-private transactions by controlling stockholders could be 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 243–44. 
 94. Id. at 248. 
 95. See id. at 247–48. Section 253 allows a controller to use a short-form merger if the controlling 
stockholder owns more than 90% of the shares of its subsidiary.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 253 (2014). 
 96. Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 248 (Del. 2001). 
 97. 808 A.2d 421 (Del Ch. 2002). 
 98. Id. at 445 (applying the test only to tender offers). 
 99. Id. at 444. 
 100. Id. at 433–34. 
 101. Id. at 445. 
 102. 879 A.2d 604 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
 103. Id. at 607. 
  
 Nicholas R. Rodriguez 
Vol. 10, No. 1 2015 123 
“sensibly unified through an extension of . . . [a] reformed Lynch[;]”104 meaning, “if 
a controller proposed a merger, subject from inception to negotiation and approval 
of the merger by an independent special committee and a Minority Approval 
Condition,” the business judgment rule should apply.105 
Five years after Cox, the Court of Chancery finally had the opportunity to apply 
the unified standard of review to controller freeze-outs.106 In In re CNX Gas, a 
special committee was authorized to recommend to minority stockholders whether, 
in its opinion, the tender offer by the controlling stockholder was fair.107 After an 
unaffiliated financial advisor gave its opinion to the special committee that the 
tender offer was indeed fair, several minority stockholders filed lawsuits requesting 
that the court enjoin the transaction before the tender offer could be sent out.108 
Vice Chancellor Laster rejected the controlling stockholder’s argument that the 
business judgment rule should apply, and explained that two-step going-private 
transactions are subject to entire fairness review unless the tender offer is both: (1) 
negotiated and recommended by an informed special committee of disinterested 
directors with the power to negotiate with the controlling stockholder, and (2) 
subject to a “majority of the minority” tender or vote requirement.109 Only if both of 
these conditions are met will the tender offer be protected by the business judgment 
rule.110 In dicta, the court indicated that in the context of a one-step going-private 
merger by a controlling stockholder, the business judgment rule would apply under 
the same conditions; however, that question was not squarely presented to the 
court.111 
III. The Court’s Reasoning 
In Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., the Delaware Supreme Court held that business 
judgment is the standard of review that governs going-private mergers by 
controlling stockholders, when the merger is conditioned “ab initio” upon both: (1) 
the approval of an independent, adequately-empowered special committee that 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 643–44 (footnotes omitted). 
 106. In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders Litig., 4 A.3d 397, 400 (Del. Ch. 2010).  
 107. Id. at 404. 
 108. Id. at 399–400, 405. 
 109. Id. at 413. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders Litig., 4 A.3d 397, 414 (Del. Ch. 2010); but see In re Cox Radio, Inc. 
S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 4461-VCP, 2010 WL 1806616, at *11 (Del. Ch. May 6, 2010) (rejecting the unified 
standard), aff’d, 9 A.3d 475 (Del. 2010) (noting that the court did “not express any view as to the proper 
standard by which the underlying transaction should be reviewed”). 
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fulfills its duty of care to negotiate a fair price; and (2) the uncoerced, informed vote 
of a majority of the minority stockholders.112 
The court provided four justifications for its holding.113 First, entire fairness 
review in a controller merger is a substitute for the dual protections of a 
disinterested board and stockholder approval since the controller has an influence 
on both of these components.114 By employing these protections upfront, however, 
the controller is no longer an influencing force, and the merger acquires the 
“shareholder-protective characteristics of third-party, arm’s-length mergers, which 
are viewed under the business judgment standard.”115 Second, the dual protections 
“optimally protect[] the minority stockholders in controller buyouts[,]” by 
preventing the controlling stockholder from dictating the outcome of the 
negotiation and dangling the majority-of-the-minority vote before the special 
committee.116 “[The structure] will provide a strong incentive for controlling 
stockholders to accord minority investors the transactional structure that respected 
scholars believe will provide them the best protection,” since the minority 
stockholders get the benefit of “independent, empowered negotiating agents to 
bargain for the best price and say no . . . [and] the critical ability to determine for 
themselves whether to accept any deal.”117 Third, the dual protection structure “is 
consistent with the central traditions of Delaware law, which defers to the informed 
decisions of impartial directors.”118 Fourth, the underlying purpose of the dual 
protection merger utilized by MacAndrews & Forbes and the entire fairness 
standard converged “at the same critical point: price.”119 The dual protection 
structure: 
requires two price-related pretrial determinations: first, that a fair price was 
achieved by an empowered, independent committee that acted with care; 
and, second, that a fully-informed, uncoerced majority of the minority 
stockholders voted in favor of the price that was recommended by the 
independent committee.120 
Summarizing its holding, the court made clear that the business judgment rule 
will only be applied if: 
 
 112. Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014). 
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(i) the controller conditions the procession of the transaction on the 
approval of both a Special Committee and a majority of the minority 
stockholders; (ii) the Special Committee is independent; (iii) the Special 
Committee is empowered to freely select its own advisors and to say no 
definitively; (iv) the Special Committee meets its duty of care in negotiating 
a fair price; (v) the vote of the minority is informed; and (vi) there is no 
coercion of the minority.121 
In a footnote, the court noted that the complaint against the defendants would 
have survived a motion to dismiss because the “allegations about the sufficiency of 
the price call[ed] into question the adequacy of the Special Committee’s 
negotiations, thereby necessitating discovery on all of the new prerequisites . . . .”122 
The court explained that, if after discovery, triable issues of fact remain about 
whether all of the conditions were established, the case would proceed to trial where 
the court would review the conduct under entire fairness.123 
After announcing this new standard, the court concluded that all six of the 
prerequisites had been met.124 Specifically, the court held that: (1) the MFW board 
agreed ab initio to both procedural protections;125 (2) the evidence failed to show an 
economic relationship between members of the Special Committee and Ron 
Perelman sufficient to compromise the independence of the committee;126 (3) the 
Special Committee, with the help of its financial advisors that it chose itself, had the 
right to say no definitively and to solicit offers from other potential buyers;127 (4) the 
Special Committee met its duty of care in negotiating a fair price where its financial 
advisor, Evercore, opined that $25 per share was a fair price based on generally 
accepted valuation methodologies, and where the plaintiffs had failed to provide 
evidence to the contrary;128 (5) the vote of the minority was informed where a proxy 
statement sent out to all stockholders disclosed the background of the Special 
Committee’s work, of Evercore’s valuation ranges, and of the analyses supporting 
Evercore’s fairness opinion;129 and (6) there was no coercion of the minority.130  
As a result of these findings, the court determined that the Court of Chancery 
had properly held that the business judgment rule applied.131 Finding that the 
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plaintiffs had not rebutted this deferential standard, the court affirmed the 
judgment of the Court of Chancery in favor of the defendants.132 
IV. Analysis 
In M&F Worldwide, the Delaware Supreme Court held that a going-private merger 
by a controlling stockholder is reviewed under the business judgment rule when the 
merger is conditioned upfront upon the approval of both an independent, 
adequately-empowered special committee that acted with due care to negotiate a 
fair price, and an informed, uncoerced majority of the minority stockholders.133 
While the court’s holding was properly motivated by the underlying principle of 
Lynch, protecting the unaffiliated stockholder,134 the court missed an opportunity to 
adopt a unified standard of review for going-private transactions.135 Moreover, the 
court created potential ambiguity by adding a condition that the Court of Chancery 
did not—that the special committee must meet its duty of care in negotiating a fair 
price—thereby introducing a component of entire fairness review into the 
analysis.136 Even assuming that the fair price condition does not change the roadmap 
laid out by Chancellor Strine, the M&F transaction structure is unlikely to be used 
by controlling stockholders because considerations other than the benefits of the 
business judgment rule will encourage controllers to use tender offers.137 
A. The M&F Worldwide Court was Properly Motivated by the Core Objective of 
Lynch: Protecting the Unaffiliated Stockholder 
In Weinberger, the Delaware Supreme Court first noted the difference between a 
merger where a party stands on both sides of the transaction, and a merger where 
parties negotiate at arm’s length.138 Similarly, in Lynch, the fear was that a court 
could not be certain that a transaction by a parent-subsidiary could “fully 
approximate” what independent parties would have done in an arm’s length 
transaction.139 The goal, therefore, has very clearly been to replicate the protections 
that are afforded to shareholders who negotiate at arm’s length.140 Post-Lynch, 
courts have continued to follow this jurisprudence by reviewing going-private 
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mergers under the entire fairness standard to make sure that the same result would 
have been achieved had the parties negotiated at arm’s length.141 Because courts 
have rarely pursued alternative methods to mimic the protections of an arm’s 
length transaction, entire fairness (until M&F) has been deemed the best judicial 
tool to protect the minority shareholders from bad deals.142 The M&F Worldwide 
court, by employing the business judgment rule when the merger is conditioned 
upfront on the approval of both an independent special committee and a majority 
of the minority stockholders, has found a proper alternative to entire fairness: a 
pseudo arm’s length transaction.143 Thus, the court, finding its roots in Lynch, was 
properly motivated by a desire to protect the minority stockholder. 
An arm’s length transaction requires both an unconflicted negotiating agent and 
approval by disinterested stockholders.144 A special committee and a majority-of-
the-minority vote similarly create a structure that provides “procedural protections 
beyond those afforded by full disclosure of facts.”145 While an arm’s-length merger is 
not perfect, it does seem to provide for a much fairer transaction. 
Having an independent special committee with the power to say no is 
enormously beneficial to minority stockholders and is not a procedural protection 
that is often missing from freeze-out transactions.146 The special committee 
replicates the unconflicted bargaining agent, whose job it is to negotiate without 
bias.147 Like the bargaining agent, the special committee negotiates with the 
controller to increase the price per share for the minority stockholder.148 Contrary to 
 
 141. See, e.g., In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 445 (Del Ch. 2002) (requiring a non-
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minority stockholder arguments, the special committee frequently says “no” to low 
offers or walks away from the table if the price is not right.149 It is therefore generally 
accepted that special committees play a role in going-private transactions in the 
controller context.150 
What is more important and generally less accepted is the majority-of-the 
minority condition.151 Working in tandem with the special committee, the majority-
of-the-minority vote is a way for stockholders to express whether they agree with 
the price per share that the special committee has negotiated.152 Since the majority-
of-the-minority vote is an upfront condition, it properly replicates the disinterested 
stockholder vote required in an arm’s length negotiation.153 Without this approval, 
the transaction will fail. Moreover, activist investors’ involvement as minority 
shareholders enhances the protective characteristics of the majority-of-the-minority 
vote.154 Thus, outside of outright coercion, fraud, or illegality,155 an upfront 
majority-of-the-minority vote, together with a special committee condition, 
sufficiently replicates the characteristics (and protections) of a third-party arm’s-
length transaction. Accordingly, the objectives that the Lynch court sought to 
achieve by requiring entire fairness review are met by this structure.156 
But why would a controller ever choose to employ both of these procedural 
protections? This new structure creates a doctrinal incentive for the controlling 
stockholder.157 The Delaware Supreme Court in Rosenblatt similarly incentivized the 
use of a majority-of-the-minority vote by shifting the burden of proof from the 
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defendant to the plaintiff.158 The Lynch court incentivized the use of either 
protection by giving controlling stockholders the benefit of not having to prove 
entire fairness.159 Here, like Lynch and Rosenblatt, the M&F court was correctly 
motivated by tradition, providing an additional incentive to use both procedural 
protections.160 
B. Adopting a Unified Standard of Review for Going-Private Transactions Would 
Have Reinforced the Court’s Commitment to Protecting the Minority Stockholder 
Following the Siliconix and Glassman decisions, the Court of Chancery recognized 
how inconsistent controller freeze-out doctrine had become.161 Two transaction 
structures, which ultimately had the same result, were being reviewed under 
different standards.162 Pre-MFW, the tender offer was reviewed under the business 
judgment rule so long as it was not coercive and did not contain disclosure 
violations, whereas the negotiated merger, regardless of the conditions, was subject 
to entire fairness review.163 Observing a prime opportunity to shift away from 
treating these structures differently, Chancellor Strine explained that freeze-outs 
that were conditioned upon the approval of both an independent special committee 
and a majority of the minority stockholders would be subject to the business 
judgment rule regardless of the transactional method.164 The Delaware Supreme 
Court, however, was silent on the issue, which suggests that the M&F framework 
only applies to negotiated mergers. 
Since the Solomon line of cases confused freeze-out doctrine, clarity has been at 
the forefront of Chancery Court decisions.165 Chancellor Strine continued down this 
path by providing a clear standard. The business judgment rule would apply so long 
as the MFW conditions were met, notwithstanding the transaction structure.166 
While the Delaware Supreme Court was similarly clear as to the conditions needed 
to achieve deferential review,167 the court failed to address an important aspect of 
Chancellor Strine’s opinion: the unified standard. 
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Though the decision to go private comes to the same end—a private company—
these two transaction structures and their standards of review continue to be 
inconsistent and confusing.168 A single standard of review would alleviate this issue. 
By unifying the doctrines, the Delaware Supreme Court could have made the 
default standard entire fairness for both tender offers and negotiated mergers, while 
only invoking the business judgment rule when the M&F prerequisites were met. 
Consistent with Delaware tradition, this unified standard would have provided for 
an enhanced level of predictability in the judicial arena.169 Ultimately, however, the 
Delaware Supreme Court failed to address M&F’s applicability to tender offers, 
which provides little incentive for controllers to use the dual protections when the 
going-private transaction is structured as a tender offer.170 
C. The Court Created Potential Ambiguity by Adding a Condition that the 
Chancery Court did Not—that the Special Committee Must Meet Its Duty of Care in 
Negotiating a Fair Price—Thereby Introducing an Aspect of Entire Fairness into the 
Analysis 
While the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery’s decision to 
grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the court altered the fourth 
prerequisite of the MFW framework.171 As a result of this modification, a court will 
likely be required to make a fact-intensive pretrial determination before applying 
the business judgment rule, which limits the litigation benefit that Chancellor Strine 
sought to achieve.172 
Unlike Chancellor Strine’s opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court’s framework 
requires (in addition to the other five prerequisites) that “the Special Committee 
meet[] its duty of care in negotiating a fair price.”173 Although due care is a 
component of the business judgment rule and was a part of Chancellor Strine’s 
opinion, fair price is absent in both of these.174  Instead, fair price is an element of 
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entire fairness review.175 The M&F court, explaining its reasoning, stated that the 
dual-protection structure requires two price-related pretrial determinations, one of 
which is “that a fair price was achieved by an empowered, independent committee 
that acted with care.”176 However, “whether an independent committee was effective 
in negotiating a price is a process so fact-intensive and inextricably intertwined with 
the merits of an entire fairness review (fair dealing and fair price) that a pretrial 
determination . . . is often impossible.”177 The court failed to provide further 
guidance on this prong, which will leave the fourth condition open to 
interpretation, the most reasonable interpretation of which is that a court is 
required to make a fact-intensive fair price inquiry.178 
Accordingly, though on its face, the Delaware Supreme Court’s test seems to 
affirm the lower court’s decision, the need to establish that the special committee 
acted with due care to negotiate a fair price changes the analysis. Instead of 
deference, the standard appears to create an onerous fairness inquiry at step four, 
similar to the fair price prong of entire fairness.179 Effectively, an element of entire 
fairness is now one of the prerequisites to achieve business judgment, albeit in an 
arguably less scrutinous manner.180 The language used by the court may be more 
deferential than a fair price inquiry because it appears to require some combination 
of fair price and the duty of care.181 Nevertheless, reading the condition together 
with the detailed fair price discussion by the M&F court suggests that a quick win 
for a controlling stockholder is doubtful.182 A plaintiff should easily be able to 
challenge the “fair price” condition to avoid a motion to dismiss, or, with sufficient 
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affidavits, a motion for summary judgment.183 With the Delaware court’s rejection 
of the federal pleading standard announced in Twombly-Iqbal, plaintiffs need only 
satisfy the lower pleading standard of “reasonable conceivability” to survive a 
motion to dismiss.184 Unfortunately, a plaintiff’s recognition that the fair price 
condition requires a fact-intensive inquiry will “allow plaintiffs to extract settlement 
value out of non-meritorious claims.”185 These claims could be combated with a 
more deferential analysis.186 
Even the allegations made in the complaint in M&F Worldwide would have 
survived a motion to dismiss and required discovery on all of the prerequisites 
listed by the court.187 Only with “100,000 pages” of discovery was the court able to 
conclusively establish that the fair price condition had been met.188 The high cost of 
discovery is one reason that defendants seek to settle,189 and is a reason why the 
application of M&F Worldwide at the motion to dismiss stage is so essential.190 
Moreover, this type of fact-intensive review is not the hands-off approach that 
Delaware courts traditionally take.191 How does a court measure a special 
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committee’s duty of care to negotiate a fair price? This will be a question that the 
Delaware Supreme Court may have to answer in the near future. 
D. Even if the Fair Price Condition Added by the Delaware Supreme Court is 
Measured by Gross Negligence, the M&F Worldwide Decision will Likely Not Yield a 
Significant Change in Transaction Structure Choice Taken by Controlling Stockholders 
Because Transactional Risks of Upfront Conditions are Too Great and Tender Offers 
are a Preferable Mechanism 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the special committee’s need to exercise a duty of 
care to negotiate a fair price is measured by a gross negligence standard,192 the 
structure announced in M&F Worldwide is unlikely to be used by controlling 
stockholders because considerations other than the benefits of the business 
judgment rule will encourage controllers to use tender offers.193 Stated differently, 
the business judgment rule incentive, from a controller’s perspective, is not enough 
to gamble on upfront conditions.194 Instead, controlling stockholders will seek a 
quicker transaction structure, which makes the tender offer the preferable 
mechanism.195 
The ab initio conditions that the Delaware Supreme Court has placed on the 
controlling stockholder make it unlikely that there will be a large use of the M&F 
framework. To receive the deferential business judgment rule, the approval by a 
majority of the minority stockholders and a special committee must be upfront.196 
An upfront majority-of-the-minority condition is not a tool that controlling 
stockholders frequently use in going-private transactions,197 since conditioning the 
merger on approval by a group of stockholders, some of whom may be institutional 
investors, is risky.198 These are risks that a controller is likely to avoid.199 For 
example, if a controller is unsure that a majority-of-the-minority vote will go 
favorably, he may be much more willing to roll the dice on Lynch’s entire fairness 
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with burden shifting, rather than being rejected by a majority-of-the-minority vote 
from the start.200 Furthermore, the controller must meet five additional prerequisites 
to receive the business judgment rule, which makes it very difficult for the 
controlling stockholder to satisfy the M&F framework on a motion to dismiss, or, 
as mentioned supra, a motion for summary judgment.201 While a litigation incentive 
exists to abide by the M&F structure, a cost-benefit analysis reveals that the benefits 
of the business judgment rule are not worth the risks. 
Instead of the business judgment rule incentive, a controller’s choice of 
transaction structure likely will be motivated by the speed of the transaction, which 
makes the tender offer the superior method.202 If another bidder is in the picture, 
which may be likely if the initial offer is low, the controller will want to quickly take 
the company private via tender offer.203 On average, mergers take 75 days longer 
than tender offers to complete.204 Negotiated mergers are also expensive, due 
particularly to the need to prepare, file, and mail proxy statements and hold 
stockholder meetings.205 One would assume that most controlling stockholders want 
transactions that are less risky, cost-effective, and quick.206 The tender offer is 
therefore the preferable mechanism. 
Moreover, federal agencies are indirectly encouraging tender offers through 
faster filing requirements. The SEC allows tender offers to be filed on the same day 
that the tender offer begins, while requiring mergers to be subjected to at least ten 
days of review before the proxy is sent out.207 This, again, contributes to longer 
timeframes for mergers as compared to tender offers.208 
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Even the Delaware legislature has expedited the tender offer process.209 Section 
251(h) of the DGCL was recently amended to allow for controlling stockholders to 
benefit from an “opt-in” program that eliminates the need for stockholder approval 
during the second-step of a two-step merger.210 This permits controlling 
stockholders to avoid a long and cumbersome vote at the second step.211 While the 
Delaware General Assembly has streamlined the tender offer process, legislation in 
one-step negotiated mergers has stayed dormant. Accordingly, it will not be until 
legislative initiatives better encourage controlling stockholders to use negotiated 
mergers instead of the more coercive tender offer that we will see a significant 
change in transaction structure. 
V. Conclusion 
M&F Worldwide provides an incentive for controllers to adopt a transaction 
structure that best protects the minority stockholder.212 Still, the conditions and 
risks that this structure creates will likely prevent most controlling stockholders 
from using the M&F framework.213 The fair price condition likewise delivers a 
hurdle that may restrain a controlling stockholder from implementing this 
structure.214 Nevertheless, a path has been made for controllers to reduce the impact 
of post-merger lawsuits that are bound to occur. 
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